Separated by Civilization: Trans-Atlantic Impasse (1)

The war in Iraq has made the Atlantic seem wider. But really it has had the effect of a magnifying glass, bringing older and more fundamental differences between Europe and the United States into focus. (2)

These growing divisions? over war, peace, religion, sex, life and death? amount to a philosophical dispute about the common origins of European and American civilization. Both children of the Enlightenment, the United States and Europe clearly differ about the nature of this inheritance and about who is its better custodian. (3)

Start with religion. The United States is experiencing a revival of the Christian faith in many areas of civic and political life, while in Europe the process of secularization continues unabated. (4)Today the United States is the most religious-minded society of the Western democracies. In a 2003 Harris poll (5) 79 percent of Americans said they believed in God, and more than a third said they attended a religious service once a month or more. Numerous polls have shown that these figures are much lower in Western Europe. In the United States a majority of respondents in recent years told pollsters that they believed in angels, while in Europe the issue was apparently considered so preposterous (6) that no one even asked the question.

Terms that President George W. Bush has used, like "crusade" and "axis of evil," and Manichaean exclusions like his observation that anyone who is not on our side is on the side of the terrorists, reveal the assumption of a religious mantle by a secular power, which in Europe has become unthinkable. (7) Was it not, perhaps, this same sense of religious infallibility that seduced senior members of the Bush administration into leading their country into a war with Iraq on the basis of information that has turned out to be false? (8)

Another reason for Europe's alienation from the United States is harder to define, but for want of a better term, I call it American narcissism (9).

When American troops in Iraq mistakenly shoot an Arab journalist or reduce half of a village to rubble in response to the explosion of a roadside bomb, there will inevitably be a backlash (10). Only a fool would maintain that an occupying power could afford many such mistakes, even if it is under constant threat of suicide attacks. The success of an occupation policy — however temporary it is meant to be — depends on the occupier's ability to convince the population, by means of symbolic and material gestures, that it is prepared to admit to mistakes.

In its use of the language of power the Bush administration has created the opposite impression, and not just in Iraq. The United States apparently cannot be wrong about anything, nor does it have to apologize to anybody. In many parts of the world people have come to believe, fairly or not, that Americans regard the life of their countrymen as infinitely more valuable than the lives of any other of the earth's inhabitants.

Of course, even in Europe only a pacifist minority denies the existence of necessary, unavoidable, justified wars. (11) The interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (12) were supported by many European nations, even if some took a long time to make up their minds. European soldiers took part in those wars and continue to play a part in the peacekeeping aftermath (13).

What arouses European suspicion, though, is the doctrine of just, preemptive wars Bush has outlined. Anyone who claims to be waging a preventive war in the cause of justice is confusing either a particular or a partisan interest with the interests of humanity. A president who makes such a claim would be arrogating the right to be the ultimate arbiter of war and peace and to stand in judgment over the world. (14) From there it is but a short step to dismissing a basic insight of the Enlightenment, namely that human judgment and decisions are fallible by their very nature. This fallibility cannot be annulled or ameliorated by any political, legal or religious authority. The same argument goes for the death penalty. (15)

Animosity (16) isn't the only feature of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Europe is rightly envious of America's multicultural society. There can be no doubt that the United States has produced the World's most varied and integrative culture, and it is no accident that it is the only one to have a worldwide appeal.

But the American multicultural model also generates an illusion. Since Americans really have come from all over the world, in the United States it is easy to believe that you can know and understand the world without ever leaving the country. Those who were born and brought up in America forget that these people "from all over the world" first had to become Americans? a condition that new immigrants generally accept with enthusiasm? before they could celebrate their cultural otherness. (17)

The impressive integrative power of American society seems to generate a kind of obliviousness to the world, a multicultural unilateralism. (18) The result is a paradox: a fantastically tolerant and flexible society that has absorbed the whole world, yet has difficulty comprehending the world beyond its borders.

These differences and irritations add up to a substantial disagreement on the joint origins of American and European civilization. Europeans think that Americans are on their way to betraying some of the elementary tenets of the Enlightenment, establishing a new principle in which they are "first among unequals." (19)

And Washington accuses Europe of shirking its international responsibilities, and thus its own human rights inheritance.

Unfortunately, we cannot expect the news media in the United States or Europe to present a nuanced20 views of this dispute. In (20) years of traveling back and forth between Germany and America I have become convinced that news broadcasts usually confirm their audiences' views: in Europe, about America, the "cowboy nation," and in the United States, about Europe, the "axis of weasels (21)."

These disagreements will be influenced but cannot be resolved by the American presidential election in November. The divisions are too deep, and Europe cannot meet the United States halfway on too many issues? the separation between church and state, the separation of powers, respect for international law, the abolition of the death penalty--without surrendering its version of its Enlightenment inheritance (22).

On other contentious issues the United States feels as strongly: the universality of human rights and the need to intervene -- if the United Nations is unable to act -- when there is genocide or ethnic cleansing, or when states are failing. (23)

So are we standing on the threshold of a new understanding or a new historic divide, comparable to the evolutionary split that occurred when a group of pioneer hominids thousands of years ago turned their backs forever on their African homeland? (24)

So far it has usually been the Americans who have had to remind the Europeans of these common origins, which the Europeans, in turn, have so often betrayed. Maybe this time it is up to the Europeans to remind the Americans of the promises of the Enlightenment that the Unite States seems to have forgotten.

(1). impasse：僵局。

(2). 但實(shí)際上這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)具有放大鏡的效果，讓歐洲和美國(guó)之間由來(lái)已久的、更為根本的區(qū)別凸顯出來(lái)。

(3). 美國(guó)和歐洲均為啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)的后代，但它們對(duì)這份遺產(chǎn)的性質(zhì)以及誰(shuí)才是其最佳繼承人的看法顯然不同。child：后代/深受某種影響的人;the Enlightenment：?jiǎn)⒚蛇\(yùn)動(dòng)，指18世紀(jì)歐洲以推崇“理性”、懷疑教會(huì)權(quán)威和封建制度為特點(diǎn)的文化思想運(yùn)動(dòng);custodian：原意是“保管人”，這里指遺產(chǎn)的繼承人。

(4). secularization：世俗化;unabated：不減弱的，不衰退的。

(5). Harris Poll：哈里斯民意測(cè)驗(yàn)，在美國(guó)很有權(quán)威性。

(6). preposterous：荒謬的，愚蠢的。

(7). 布什總統(tǒng)使用著“十字軍東征”、“邪惡軸心”之類(lèi)的詞兒，奉行不在我們這邊，就在恐怖主義那邊的排他主義，這都反映了一個(gè)世俗政權(quán)繼承了宗教衣缽的架勢(shì)，而這種架勢(shì)在歐洲是不可思議的。manichaean/;m*n!#ki:2n/：二元論者的，非此即彼的;mantle：(作為權(quán)力標(biāo)志的)衣缽。

(8). infallibility：絕對(duì)可靠性,下文中的fallibility則指“不可靠性”;seduce：引誘。

(9). narcissism：自我陶醉，自戀。

(10). backlash：強(qiáng)烈反應(yīng)。

(11). 當(dāng)然，甚至在歐洲也只有少數(shù)的和平主義者否認(rèn)存在著必要的、難以避免的正義戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。pacifist：和平主義者，反戰(zhàn)主義者。

(12). Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan：波斯尼亞、科索沃、阿富汗，1995年、1999年和2001年，以美國(guó)為首的北約曾對(duì)這三個(gè)地區(qū)或國(guó)家進(jìn)行軍事干預(yù)或占領(lǐng)。

(13). aftermath：指戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束后的一個(gè)時(shí)期。

(14). 而引起歐洲疑慮的是布什提出的先發(fā)制人的正義戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)理論。任何人宣稱(chēng)自己是以正義的名義發(fā)動(dòng)一場(chǎng)預(yù)防性戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)都是在混淆個(gè)人或黨派的利益與整個(gè)人類(lèi)的利益。作此言論的總統(tǒng)都是僭取了對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與和平的最終仲裁權(quán)，并操縱對(duì)整個(gè)世界的裁判。preemptive：先發(fā)制人的;partisan：黨派的;arrogate：僭取;arbiter：裁決人，決定者。

(15). 這種犯錯(cuò)誤的必然性并不會(huì)因?yàn)槿魏握?、法律或宗教的?quán)力而消除或得到改善。這一論斷同樣適用于死刑(多年來(lái)，美國(guó)的死刑制度一直受到來(lái)自歐洲的壓力，歐洲委員會(huì)每年都以報(bào)告的形式呼吁美國(guó)廢除死刑——編者注)。annul/2#n7l/：廢除，取消;ameliorate：改良，改善。

(16). animosity：(尤指表現(xiàn)于行動(dòng)的)仇恨，敵意。

(17). 那些在美國(guó)出生并長(zhǎng)大的人忘了這些“來(lái)自全世界”的人們首先必須變成美國(guó)人(新移民通常積極熱情地接受此條件)，然后才能慶祝他們自己的文化相異性。otherness：另一性，不同性。

(18). obliviousness：忽視;multicultural unilateralism：多元文化的單邊主義。

(19). tenet/#ti:net/：信條，宗旨;“first among unequals”：“在不平等人群里的上等人”，這是對(duì)美國(guó)人信仰里的“人生而平等”的極大諷刺。

(20). nuanced/#nj u:#4:nst/：細(xì)致入微的。

(21). “鼬鼠軸心”，這是美國(guó)媒體給反對(duì)美國(guó)出兵伊拉克的法、德兩國(guó)冠以的稱(chēng)號(hào)。鼬鼠在美俚中是“推諉責(zé)任的人、小人”之意。

(22).如果不放棄其(指歐洲)關(guān)于啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)遺產(chǎn)的看法。

(23). 在其他有爭(zhēng)議的問(wèn)題上美國(guó)同樣毫不退讓?zhuān)喝藱?quán)的普遍性，以及——當(dāng)出現(xiàn)種族滅絕和清洗行為或國(guó)家搖搖欲墜之時(shí)——干預(yù)的必要性(如果聯(lián)合國(guó)無(wú)法采取行動(dòng)的話)。contentious：引起爭(zhēng)議的。

(24). 因此，我們是否站在了一個(gè)新的理解或一個(gè)新的歷史性的分界線的門(mén)檻上，而其意義可與千萬(wàn)年前一批類(lèi)人猿的先驅(qū)永遠(yuǎn)地告別了他們的非洲故土、開(kāi)始向人類(lèi)進(jìn)化相媲美?hominid：人科的動(dòng)物。

閱讀感評(píng)

我們常說(shuō)“東西方文明”或“中西文化”，似乎包括歐美及其他一些具有“猶太—基督教傳統(tǒng)”的國(guó)家的“西方”是一個(gè)整體(按當(dāng)前學(xué)界時(shí)髦的提法是“共同體”)，鐵板一塊，難以撼動(dòng)。然而事實(shí)是，現(xiàn)在中外各種媒體卻時(shí)時(shí)在提醒我們：歐洲與美國(guó)正在分道揚(yáng)鑣。據(jù)說(shuō)這發(fā)端于1989年的冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束，在巴爾干半島危機(jī)和“9?11”恐怖襲擊后進(jìn)一步表面化，而到了美國(guó)入侵伊拉克后，“大西洋就顯得更加寬廣無(wú)邊了”。

記得我去年參加“世界啟蒙大會(huì)”時(shí)，注意到有一個(gè)議題是“跨大西洋的啟蒙：舊世界的遺產(chǎn)和新世界的觀念”(the Trans-atlantic Enlightenment：Old World Legacies and New World Ideas)。不可否認(rèn)，歐洲的遺產(chǎn)和美洲的觀念必然會(huì)有淵源關(guān)系;但是，一個(gè)大西洋的距離以及當(dāng)時(shí)歐洲與新大陸之間自然、社會(huì)條件的迥異，“啟蒙”在那片蠻荒之地是足以變化出讓當(dāng)事人都吃驚的變體的，更不用提到了兩、三個(gè)世紀(jì)之后的今天了。就在那次大會(huì)上，甚至還有學(xué)者組織了一個(gè)研討會(huì)，“Is there a European Culture?” 在他們看來(lái)，不用說(shuō)“西方”，即使是“歐洲”諸國(guó)也是各說(shuō)各的話，差異很明顯。

當(dāng)然，學(xué)者在研討會(huì)上的討論也不能全信，因?yàn)楫?dāng)今的學(xué)術(shù)有時(shí)為了邏輯性常常會(huì)把問(wèn)題簡(jiǎn)單化，而且為了提出一種獨(dú)特的理論或觀點(diǎn)往往還會(huì)走極端。由此看來(lái)，在歐美之間穿梭來(lái)回的這位德國(guó)作家Peter Schneider的看法可能會(huì)更中肯些。

他認(rèn)為，雖然歐洲和美國(guó)均為“啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)”的后代，但它們對(duì)于這筆遺產(chǎn)的性質(zhì)以及誰(shuí)是最佳繼承人各執(zhí)一詞。它們?cè)趹?zhàn)爭(zhēng)與和平、宗教、性、生與死方面觀點(diǎn)相悖，而且越走越遠(yuǎn)。接著，作者在屬于當(dāng)前熱點(diǎn)的幾大方面對(duì)美國(guó)和歐洲各自的觀點(diǎn)進(jìn)行對(duì)比：在宗教上，美國(guó)的基督教信仰正在復(fù)興，而歐洲卻越來(lái)越世俗化。由此引申，以布什為首的美國(guó)人比較熱衷“二元對(duì)立”，將自己的事業(yè)看作“十字軍東征”，而反對(duì)他的任何人均屬“邪惡軸心”，歐洲人對(duì)此覺(jué)得有些不可思議。第二個(gè)方面是作者所謂的“美國(guó)式的孤芳自賞”，即美國(guó)人認(rèn)為自己不會(huì)犯錯(cuò)誤，而且認(rèn)為美國(guó)人的生命要比地球上其他人的生命珍貴得多，因此他們從不認(rèn)錯(cuò)或道歉，而且一旦受到攻擊，便會(huì)瘋狂地報(bào)復(fù);美國(guó)宣揚(yáng)“先發(fā)制人”的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的合理合法性，而歐洲人質(zhì)疑美國(guó)人的動(dòng)機(jī)，認(rèn)為這很容易把一己的利益與整個(gè)人類(lèi)的利益相混淆，導(dǎo)致美國(guó)總統(tǒng)自封為世界戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與和平的最后仲裁者這樣的后果。說(shuō)到底，歐洲人對(duì)此持不同看法的理由是人人都難免犯錯(cuò)誤，沒(méi)有什么永遠(yuǎn)正確的“神”或“權(quán)威”，其實(shí)這正是“啟蒙思想”的一個(gè)核心原則。在美國(guó)人所謂的“多元文化”上，作者坦言美國(guó)創(chuàng)造了世界上最多樣、最有凝聚力的文化，而且是唯一的一個(gè)具有世界性魅力的文化。然而，作者也清醒地認(rèn)識(shí)到，美國(guó)的多元文化是有條件的，即你要先承認(rèn)美國(guó)的價(jià)值觀，也就是說(shuō)，美國(guó)人對(duì)“他者”容忍的前提是你首先要“崇美”，否則就要以所謂的“un-Americanness”予以調(diào)查甚至剝奪你的自由，如20世紀(jì)50年代的麥卡錫主義直至前幾年對(duì)美籍華人科學(xué)家李文和的間諜指控以及近年來(lái)對(duì)在美阿拉伯人的防范與歧視等等都是佐證。最后，在美國(guó)愈演愈烈的單邊主義問(wèn)題上，歐洲人認(rèn)為應(yīng)該在國(guó)際關(guān)系中提倡談判協(xié)商與妥協(xié)，而美國(guó)人認(rèn)為人權(quán)是普遍性的，干預(yù)是必須的?？傊?，歐美相互指責(zé)，美國(guó)人說(shuō)歐洲人逃避責(zé)任，是“axis of weasels”;而歐洲人卻說(shuō)美國(guó)人背離了啟蒙思想的理念，是“cowboy nation”。(牛仔會(huì)引起以下聯(lián)想：reckless，arrogant，oblivious to the world。)

文明如同文化，是個(gè)相當(dāng)大的話題，我們不妨給它分分類(lèi)，如政治文明、經(jīng)濟(jì)文明、日常生活文明、文學(xué)藝術(shù)文明，等等。顯然，以上涉及的歐洲與美國(guó)(其實(shí)主要是美國(guó)與所謂“舊歐洲”的代表——法國(guó)與德國(guó))的分歧屬于政治文明的范疇，而在這個(gè)范疇里，“西方”作為一個(gè)整體確實(shí)顯示了分崩離析的跡象。美國(guó)人現(xiàn)在大多采取攻勢(shì)，而歐洲則處于守勢(shì)。但是，文明在這里到底扮演了多重要的角色呢?

眾所周知，面對(duì)一場(chǎng)政治沖突時(shí)，人們可能采取的對(duì)策不外乎三種：談判解決、動(dòng)用武力、接受失敗。美國(guó)與歐洲在處理國(guó)際政治問(wèn)題時(shí)的分歧可以簡(jiǎn)單地用以下的“兩分法”來(lái)展示：Power vs. Weakness, Armed Intervention vs. Negotiation, Unilateral Action vs. Multilateral Consultation，而這些分歧其實(shí)與西方的文明傳統(tǒng)并沒(méi)有太直接的關(guān)系，直接有關(guān)的是美國(guó)與歐洲目前所面臨的“形勢(shì)”，換句話說(shuō)，是“形勢(shì)”或許還有因此而來(lái)的對(duì)“利益”的考慮才迫使他們做出抉擇。美國(guó)在冷戰(zhàn)后完全可以憑借其強(qiáng)大的軍事和經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力，按“叢林原則”一意孤行而絕少有較大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而歐洲就不一樣了。二戰(zhàn)以后，德、英、法各國(guó)均不同程度地受到削弱，他們不可能完全憑自己的力量稱(chēng)霸，因此類(lèi)似“歐盟”這樣的“妥協(xié)產(chǎn)物”就成了他們主要追求的目標(biāo)，這與二戰(zhàn)前顯著不同。文明通?！盁o(wú)國(guó)界”，具有穩(wěn)定性;政治則往往局限在一個(gè)國(guó)家里面，反復(fù)無(wú)常。所以，我在此要借用文明的聲音為文明申冤：近年來(lái)我受夠了“替罪羊”、“出氣筒”的角色，我是無(wú)辜的!

這里有兩個(gè)悖論很有趣，不妨特別提出來(lái)讓大家看個(gè)明白。一是原文提到的崇尚“多元化”、“全球化”的美國(guó)，卻對(duì)外部世界的聲音置若罔聞，執(zhí)行單邊主義;美國(guó)社會(huì)崇尚容忍與靈活性，但對(duì)國(guó)界之外的“不同社會(huì)”的態(tài)度和政策均僵化。二是美國(guó)總統(tǒng)口口聲聲說(shuō)自己的國(guó)家是“democracy”，偏偏就是他對(duì)聯(lián)合國(guó)安理會(huì)的“democratic decision”毫不理會(huì)，甚至稱(chēng)后者“irrelevant”。美國(guó)人號(hào)稱(chēng)自己是解放者(liberator)，給伊拉克人送去民主，但在聯(lián)合國(guó)的舞臺(tái)上他們就顯得很不民主。難怪有學(xué)者說(shuō)，美國(guó)人的這個(gè)做法致使人類(lèi)社會(huì)倒退了至少一個(gè)時(shí)代!

2003年，美國(guó)學(xué)者Robert Kagan在其著作Of Paradise and Power：America and Europe in the New World Order里宣稱(chēng)，美國(guó)是世界上最“modern”的國(guó)家，而歐洲國(guó)家是最“postmodern(后現(xiàn)代的)”的，但他并未做進(jìn)一步闡釋。也許在他看來(lái)，modern即意味著強(qiáng)大并崇尚武力，而postmodern意味著拒絕使用武力吧。最早提出后現(xiàn)代理論、并有著為數(shù)最多的后現(xiàn)代理論家和文學(xué)作品的美國(guó)卻把這個(gè)the most postmodern nation的桂冠拱手獻(xiàn)出或拒絕接受，這大概也算是個(gè)不大不小的悖論吧。